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Loevinger: Law and Science as Rival Systems

LAW AND SCIENCE AS RIVAL SYSTEMS
LEE LOEVINGER*

The rise of what we now call modern civilization is largely the
result of the development of two great systems of gathering and
organizing data- the dialectic and the empiric. The two systems
developed at about the same time, during the period ranging roughly
through the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, as a reaction against primitive superstition and medieval scholasticism. The dialectic system
is embodied in modern legal procedure and the empiric system has
become contemporary scientific discipline.
It is sometimes suggested or assumed that law and science have
differing methods because the law is more ancient whereas science
is a relatively modern innovation. This view is not supported by
historical analysis. The origins and the roots of both science and
law are equally ancient, and, indeed, are substantially the same; and
the principal characteristics of each as data systems developed during
the same period and in the same cultures. The origins of both law
and science lie buried deep in primitive religion and superstition,
and both were dominated by the priesthood until the emancipation
of the intellectual revolution which was the real foundation of the
scientific revolution, the industrial revolution, and the period of
enlightenment and political emancipation that began in the 16th
century. The great legal historian, Maine, says: "It is now clearly
seen by all trustworthy observers of the primitive condition of mankind that, in the infancy of the race, men could only account for
sustained or periodically recurring action by supposing a personal
agent. Thus, the wind blowing was a person and of course a divine
person; the sun rising, culminating, and setting was a person and
a divine person; the earth yielding her increase was a person and
divine. As, then, in the physical world, so in the moral. When a
king decided a dispute by a sentence, the judgment was assumed to be
the result of direct inspiration .... The only authoritative statement
of right and wrong is a judicial sentence after the facts, not one
presupposing a law which has been violated, but one which is
breathed for the first time by a higher power into the judge's mind
at the moment of adjudication."1
Throughout most of the history of mankind such factual issues
as the law undertook to determine were settled by submission to the
wager of law (or compurgation), the wager of battle, ordeal, or
Copyright 1967 by Lee Loevinger.
*Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission.
1.

MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 4, 7 (3d ed. 1888).
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torture. 2 These barbaric practices were not the result of sadistic
impulse but rather were methods of appealing to some supernatural
or divine power for a decision because of the "natural tendency in
the human mind to cast the burden of its doubts upon a higher
power, and to relieve itself from the effort of decision by seeking
in the unknown the solution of its difficulties." 3 The ordeal as a
mode of trial began to decline in 1215 when Pope Innocent III forbade the participation of priests in ordeals thus depriving them of
their divine sanction. 4 However, the ordeal persisted in one form
or another into the 19th century, and appeared in its most vulgar
and abhorrent form in the episode of sorcery and witchcraft trials
in the 16th and 17th centuries. 5 Trial by compurgation and
accusatorial conjurators was maintained until the 16th century, 6 the
use of torture persisted in England into the 17th century,7 and in
Scotland until the 18th century,8 and trial by battle survived until
finally abolished by law in England in the early 19th century. 9
In English law there were no rules of evidence at least until the
13th century, since under the primitive practices of trial by compurgation, battle, and ordeal, proof was accomplished by appeal to God.' 0
During the period from the 13th to the 16th centuries there was a
gradual change to trial by jury with a differentiation of the process
of pleading and procedure from that of proof; and the foundation
for the rules of evidence was not laid until the 16th century when
this process had taken place." The principle that a verdict must be
reached solely on evidence presented in court was not established
until the end of the 17th century; and it was not until Bushell's Case
in 1670 that English courts accepted the principle that jurors may
not be punished for acquitting a defendant.' 2 Right of crossexamination by counsel was established at the beginning of the 18th
century.' 3 The rules of evidence were developed during the 18th
2. LEA, SuPERnSTiON AND FORCE (1878). This is one of the great works of
scholarship in legal history and traces the history of early legal practices that are
not commonly studied in law schools or known to lawyers, although they prevailed over a much longer period than the more modern and refined practices
with which we are familiar.

3. Id. at 94.
4. 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrTANICA 159 (1966).

5.

LEA, SUPERSTTON AND FORCE

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 13-91.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 176-216.

10. 1 WIoMoRE,

EVIDENCE

217-370 (1878).

§8 (3d ed. 1940).

11. Ibid.
12. 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrTANICA 160 (1966).
13. 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §8 (3d ed. 1940).
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century and the first treatise on the law of evidence was published
in 1726.14 The rules of evidence were fully developed into a system
by the early 19th century. 15
In the early 19th century the primitive modes of trial or truthseeking were formally abolished, and the two basic evidentiary principles of modern legal procedure were established: first, none but
facts having rational probative value are admissible;16 and, second,
all facts having rational probative value are admissible unless some
specific rule excludes them. 17
Although the development of the law is identified more with
institutions and principles than with the names of individuals,
Wigmore says that five names typify the modern era of law that
began in the 17th century. 8 These are significant for the present
purpose because of the periods they represent. The names suggested
by Wigmore are Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Edward Coke (15521634), John Seldon (1584-1654), William Mansfield (1705-1793)
and William Blackstone (1723-1780).
Ancient science, like ancient law, was taught by priests and was
not a distinct or separate subject of its own.1 9 While primitive man
sought to study and to control nature, he employed magic based on
superstitious belief in rite and spell and a faith that superhuman
powers would intervene directly in response to such rituals, as in the
case of legal battle and ordeal.2 0 Science as an organized discipline
with recognized tactics and strategy involving rigorous modes of
observation and experiment has been developed only since the early
2
17th century. 1
The history of science, at least in its earlier development, is to a
large extent linked with the names of outstanding scientists. The
beginning of the modern scientific era is sometimes dated from the
time of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), but the astronomical
theories of Copernicus, which were not published until the last year
of his life, were largely speculative and inaccurate until refined and
supported by the observations of Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), Galileo
Galilei (1564-1642), and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630).
It is probably more than coincidence that Francis Bacon (156114. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16.

1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §9 (3d ed. 1940).

17. Id. §10, at293.
18.
19.

WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 1091 (1928).
1 FORBES & DIJKSTER-uiS, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1963).

20. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion, in SCIENCE, RELIGION AND REALrrY
19 (Needham ed. 1925); Singer, Historical Relations of Religion and Science, in
SCIENCE, RELIGION AND REALITY 85 (Needham ed. 1925).
21.

CONANT, ON UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE (1947).
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1626), who is mentioned as an important figure in the early development of modern law, is better known as the author of an essay on
a new method (Novum Organum) in the early history of modern
science. It was Bacon who perceived the vices of the scholastic
method and set forth clearly the widening breach which separated
the men of his day from the Middle Ages. 22 The writings of Bacon
were an impetus to the foundation of the Royal Society, and he is
thought by some to be one of the founders of the empiric method
in science.
Even a casual survey of the pioneering work in the major fields
of science will show the concomitance in the development of modem
science and modern law. Modem medicine began with the anatomical observations of Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), and the physiological observations of William Harvey (1578-1657). The modern
study of optics began with Christian Huggens (1629-1695). The
systematic study of botany began with Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778).
The foundations of modem biology were laid by Charles Darwin
(1809-1882). Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794) destroyed the old idea
of phlogiston, established the law of conservation of matter, together
with Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) discovered oxygen, and laid the
foundation of modem chemistry. Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) established the laws of motion and gravitation and laid the foundations
of modem physics. The founder of the modern scientific study of
electricity is William Gilbert (1544-1603), but the basic theory of
contemporary work in the field was laid by James Clark Maxwell
(1831-1879), and modem work in the field of electricity did not
really begin until the discovery of electrical waves or cycles in 1887
by Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894).
Thus, science and law both had their origins in the superstitions
of primitive religion and both developed their modern intellectual
outlooks during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries as a reaction
against and rejection of medieval scholasticism and superstition. The
common elements in both have been an effort to be wholly rational,
to organize and institutionalize the search for truthful data, and,
above all, to seek truthful data as the basis for judgments. Science
can equally well accept the basic principles of the legal system of
evidence: to accept only rationally probative evidence, and to
examine all relevant evidence unless there is some overriding reason
for disregarding it.
Nevertheless it is clear that the legal and the scientific methods
of inquiry are, despite those similarities, quite different. The legal
method of inquiry relies primarily on the testimony of human ob22.

2 ENCYcLOPAEDIA

BRrrTANICA

993 (1963).
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servers, tested by examination and cross-examination, and subjectively weighed by a judge or jury. Essentially this is the method
of inquiry by interrogation which may appropriately be called
"dialectic." The dialectic method is most organized and formalized
in the evidentiary and procedural rules for the conduct of legal trials.
However, essentially the same method is employed throughout the
ramifications of government in all but the most undeveloped countries. In the legislative process, as in litigation, information is sought
in hearings which employ the dialectic method, although the more
formal and rigorous rules of the evidentiary system are not commonly
employed. It is fair to say that, taking law in its largest sense as
encompassing all aspects of government, the predominant mode of
securing legal data is the dialectic method.
The scientific method is clearly a different and distinguishable
approach to data gathering, although it is not nearly so clear as was
once thought that there is any specific and unique technique that is
entitled to be known as "the scientific method." 23 Science is like law
in that it is a mode of securing agreement among different individuals
with respect to certain kinds of questions and problems. 24 The
strength of science derives from its objective and demonstrative, and
therefore highly persuasive, techniques. The limitation of science is
that it is not applicable to all kinds of questions and problems. Essentially the scientific method is applicable only to questions of the
kind commonly characterized as those involving issues of "fact."
The basic methods of science are experimental, statistical and
clinical. 2 5 The experimental method is to control the variation of
one or a few elements in a series of phenomena while observing the
concomitant variation of other elements. The statistical method
involves observation of a relatively large number of cases, either
directly or by a representative sample of the universe, to ascertain
the concomitant variation of specific elements within the universe.
The clinical method involves the observation and analysis of individual cases to determine causal, necessary, or influential relationships
among the elements of a given class of phenomena. Although scientific inquiry may thus be experimental, statistical, clinical, or possibly
taxonomic or something else, it is always empiric. Science recognizes
23. See

BRIDGMAN,

THE

Loic

OF EXPERIMENTAL INFERENCE

OF MODERN PHYSICS

(1948);

CONANT,

(1927);

CHURCHMAN, THEORY

SCIENCE (1947);
(1962); POPPER, THE LoGic OF

ON UNDERSTANDING

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERy (1959).
24. KUHN, op. cit. supra note 23; see also other references in preceding foot-

note.
25. The proposition stated is my own formulation from the references cited
herein. For an illuminating relevant analysis, see MEEHL, CLINICAL VS. STATISTICAL
PREDICTION (1954).
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no meaning that is not empirically definable and accepts no significance that is not empirically demonstrable.
The difference in the legal and scientific modes of securing data
is, as has often been observed, at least partially a function of the
different tasks performed by law and science. While science seeks to
analyze and predict phenomena, law seeks to classify and control
conduct. In the most simple and elementary terms it may be said
that the function of science is descriptive and that of law is prescriptive. The essential legal function of prescribing norms is not and
cannot be scientific in any sense which the contemporary scientific
community would recognize as scientific.
But this is only one aspect of the matter. Much of the activity
of government, including that of lawmakers, judges, administrators
and other lawyers consists of investigating and ascertaining facts.
The facts sometimes concern a single instance, as in investigating the
circumstances of a particular lawsuit, and other times involve ascertaining data concerning a class or universe, as in a legislative investigation to determine the need for a new law and the abuses to be
cured by it. However, "facts" never exist in isolation; even when
an inquiry appears to be directed at a single set of circumstances it
necessarily involves either data or assumptions regarding the universe
in which those circumstances occurred. Implicit in the whole legal
system of seeking and accepting evidence in particular cases are a
host of assumptions concerning the reliability of observation, retention and recall by human witnesses and the effectiveness of examination and cross-examination as a means of eliciting and testing recollection. These assumptions are themselves not subject either to
falsification or corroboration by the dialectic method and are precisely the kind which can be investigated and tested by the empiric
method.26 Nevertheless the law has to date made no systematic effort
either to investigate the validity and reliability of testimonial evidence or to utilize the scientific data on this subject that are available.
This raises the issue as to what the relation between law and science
is and should be.
It requires no great effort to ascertain that up to the present time
law has made little use of science, or of the empiric method, and
that lawyers generally have little understanding of science or its concepts and methods. The literature of law, like the literature of every
other field, necessarily reflects its current knowledge and wisdom.
A catalogue search of the law library serving the largest (and possibly
best) group of practicing lawyers in this country, the Federal Depart26. JAMES MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT (1966); McGaugh,
Time-Dependent Processes in Memory Storage, 153 SCIENCE 1351 (1966).
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ment of Justice, discloses almost no books that can be regarded as
truly scientific and only a few periodicals that carry any but the most
infrequent scientific reports. 2 7 In this, as in other law libraries, there

are journals which report on the use of scientific techniques in crime
detection and on medico-legal matters of significance in personal injury and related fields. Beyond this, only the poltical science journals
will reflect any of the vast amount of work being done in the behavioral sciences that may be of significance to law.2
The same picture will be found by observation of the law reviews.
I have systematically surveyed the articles carried by American law
reviews as reflected in the index of the Law Review Digest, and over
a period of years there are not enough articles reporting truly scientific work to be of numerical significance. The most significant effort
in the field has been a symposium issue on jurimetrics in Law and
Contemporary Problems. 29 The first look at jurimetrics by the Har-

vard Law Review, 30 consists mainly of discussions as to whether social
science can provide a useful method of studying the judicial process,
rather than of any reports of data gathered by scientific methods.3 1
On the other hand, there are a few significant activities indicating
recognition that the empiric method has something to contribute in
the legal field and showing some effort to employ that method. The
Law School of Columbia University has recently established a Journal
of Law and Social Problems which contains articles on legal problems
that draw material from inquiry and observation of the law in action,
as well as from the traditional library research. While the work of
this journal would hardly be accepted as rigorously scientific by a
scientist, nevertheless it does indicate some recognition that there is
some other method than the traditional legal one for securing data
27.

The notable exception is KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN

JURY

(1966).

28. Among books and periodicals not in the library that reflect work in
behavioral science and other fields that may be of significance to law, see generally
BERELSON

(1964);

&

STEINER,

BEHAVIORAL

HUMAN

BEHAVIOR:

AN

INVENTORY

OF

SCIENTIFIC

FINDINGS

SCIENCE (published by the Mental Health Research Institute

of the University of Michigan); IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY and INTERNATIONAL

SOCIAL SCIENCE J. (both published by the United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization); JURIMETRICS J. (formerly M.U.L.L. and published by
the Electronic Data Retrieval Committee of the American Bar Association); SCIENCE
(published weekly by the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
and probably the leading American scientific publication); Scientific American.
29. 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1963).

30. 79 HARV. L. REV. vii (1966) states that the June 1966 issue of the Review
will be "The Review's first venture into Jurimetrics .... "
31. 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 et seq. (1966). Since this article was written, a
somewhat more original and practical essay in jurimetrics has appeared in the
Harvard Law Review: Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory
to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966).
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that may have significance in the field of law. Perhaps the most
impressive scientific effort made by a college of law to date has been
the study of the American jury system at the University of Chicago
Law School pursuant to a grant from the Ford Foundation. The
recently published report of the first results of this study should be
required reading for every law professor, law student, practicing
lawyer and judge, both for the substantive information contained
about jury behavior, and, perhaps more importantly, for the illustration it gives of the employment of the empiric method in relation
to a legal problem. 32 Unfortunately this first report is confined to
data concerning jury behavior in criminal cases, but other reports
from the study and similar investigations are promised to be forthcoming.
The Chicago jury project appears to be unique in American law
schools as an undertaking of rigorously scientific research in a strictly
legal field. 33 Some work has been done at other American law schools,
notably Yale 34 and UCLA,3 5 but there has not yet been any production of significant empiric legal data comparable to that of the
Chicago project.
The limited efforts by lawmen to adopt and use the empiric
methods of science suggest the question whether these methods are
appropriate and useful in the field of law, or whether the dialectic
method of law is a complete alternative that leaves no need or place
32.

KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
33. For a more conventional law school view of this work, see Howe, Book
Review, Scientific American, Sept. 1966, p. 295. For a different approach to a
study of the jury see JOINER, CIVIL JUsTIcE AND THE JURY (1962).
34. Over the years individual professors at Yale have indicated an interest
in understanding and utilizing scientific methods. As early as 1935 some effort
was made to explore the relationship between law and science. See ROBINSON,
LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935). David Reisman reports that during two years at
Yale, 1947-1949, he attempted to have students use the questionnaire technique to
interview members of the bar in their home towns. He reports that they seemed
more interested in using social science to prove the virtues or vices of juries, bar
associations or polemicized themes than to discover facts about their daily work

and the practicing bar. Reisman, Problems of Method in the Social Sciences, in
INDIVIDUALISM

RECONSIDERED AND OTHER ESSAYS

435 (1954). See also

COMMUNICA-

TIONS SCIENCES AND LAW: REFLECIONS FROM THE JURIMETRICS CONFERENCE (Allen

& Caldwell eds. 1965), reporting the proceedings and conclusions of a conference
held at Yale Law School in 1963 on the Implications of Scientific Development
for Legal Education.
35. See LAW AND ELECTRONICS: THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW ERA (Edgar A.
Jones ed. 1962), reporting on the proceedings and conclusions of a conference held
at UCLA in 1960 on the Implications of Computer Technology for the Administration of Justice. It has also been reported that UCLA is establishing a Law-Science
Research Center under the directorship of Professor Edgar A. Jones, Jr. However,
this activity has not reported any significant data up to the present time.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss3/7

8

Loevinger: Law and Science as Rival Systems
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

for the empiric method. A simple inspection of other fields would
seem to create at least a prima facie presumption that science can
usefully be employed on legal problems. Clearly science has been
among the most potent of those forces that have created modern
society, both in its social aspects and in the material health and
well-being that characterize the industrialized countries. The study
of science, its methods and its subject matter, is a major aspect of
the studies of other professional schools, ranging from agriculture
and architecture through medicine to technology and zoology.
Further, regardless of its employment for strictly legal purposes,
science appears to be such a major aspect of modern culture that a
discipline which purports to establish normative principles for that
culture would seem required at least to understand it.
Thus, the question arises as to why there has been so little study
or use of science in American law schools. A variety of answers can
be and have been given. It is sometimes suggested that the case
method of study is the legal equivalent of scientific empiricism. But
this answer will not stand critical analysis. There is almost nothing
in common between the case method as employed in American law
schools and the scientific method of inquiry. To begin with, the
"cases" which are studied are almost exclusively the opinions of
appellate courts rather than the raw data of clients' complaints, the
testimony of witnesses or even the records of trials. The case method
does not involve starting with data and working through to conclusions, but rather the contrary, starting with conclusions and working
back to the most generalized and abstract statement of the fewest
data that will support the conclusions. Cases are studied in law
school within a normative and not a descriptive framework. Indeed,
the case method is little more than a pedagogical variant of textbook
study.36 Whatever its vices or virtues as a pedagogical method, the
case method is clearly not science.
Perhaps the most common answer to the question why science
is not employed in law is that the problems of law are different from
those of science, and, therefore, are not subject to empiric study.
There is a kernel of truth in this response, since there are certainly
problems within the field of law that are not appropriately subject
to scientific investigation or analysis. However, it is also the case, as
will be noted below, that even within the field of science there are
problems which cannot be resolved by the empiric method. The
significant point is that there are many problems within the field
of law that clearly are subject to empiric study and analysis, and
36. David Reisman characterizes the case method as an "impious treatment of
cases." Reisman, Toward an Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Pro-

fession, in

INDIVIDUALISM

RECONSIDERED AND OTHER ESSAYS
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that even as to these there has been little or no effort made to engage
in such research. To take only the most obvious example, the law
schools today continue to teach law in much the same manner that
it has been taught for many years, without much regard for the things
that lawyers will actually do after they have graduated. Indeed relatively little is known as to the percentage of graduates from various
law schools that go into private practice, into corporations, into
government offices or into other positions. Even less is known as to
the amount of time spent by lawyers in these various situations in
acting as counsel to small or big business, as personal and domestic
relations counsel, as criminal lawyer to the poor, as government counsel or administrators, as trial advocates, or in any other of the numerous potential roles that a lawyer may be called upon to perform.
There is no body of reliable data as to the tasks presented and the
knowledge and skills required in these various positions and for these
diverse roles. It seems almost self-evident (although it may be otherwise) that a considerably different kind of training is required for
one who is patent counsel to a large corporation and another who
is a private practitioner in a small community where he acts as
personal counsel to numerous individuals. On the other hand, it
may be that personal counseling of the poor is not much different
than acting as counsel to the rich. 37 Questions as to the actual work
of lawyers can only be asked since we do not have the data to give
any reliable answers.
However, I suggest that too many legal trade schools subjects are
filling the curricula of law schools and that not enough attention is
being paid to recent progress in the general intellectual disciplines
that lead to an understanding of the contemporary world, which is
surely required of any lawyer who is performing his function adequately. A study of accounting and of the Internal Revenue Code,
standard subjects in most law schools, may certainly be useful and
important. But these are subjects which any lawyer can, and, when
the need arises, will learn by himself. Statistics and the methods and
history of science are subjects with far broader implications and are
likely to be more useful to lawyers not only in the handling of cases
but also in understanding the world, and in contributing to the
development of the legal system.38 But these are not standard law
37. It is reported that when the Office of Economic Opportunity provided

legal aid to the poor it was anticipated that their problems would principally
involve conflicts with landlords and creditors but that of the first eighty-six
cases brought to one office seventy-two involved divorce. Newsweek, Sept. 19,
1966, p. 39.
38. For a discussion of some practical applications of statistics to specific legal
cases and problems, see Solomon, Jurimetrics, in RESEARcH PAPERS IN STATISTICS
(David ed. 1966). For some misuses of mathematics by lawyers, see Criminal Law:

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss3/7
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school curriculum courses and are not likely to be studied by law
school graduates engaged in legal work. Yet, as noted below, there
are numerous questions central to the field of law which are appropriate for empiric study and which cannot be answered without
such study. However, lawyers and law professors are generally so
ignorant of science and its methods that they are neither able to
distinguish problems which can properly be studied empirically from
those which cannot, nor to formulate questions and designs for
empiric investigation of appropriate problems.
The lack of scientific training and knowledge in the legal profession is manifest far beyond the law schools. The recent report of a
distinguished bar association committee on a subject of the most
wide ranging importance, the reconciliation of the right to a fair
trial with the maintenance of a free press, has been subject to scathing
criticism from eminent sources because of "startling inexactness in
statistical analysis" as well as total absence of statistics relating to
results.39 It has been my own experience that there are lawyers
engaged in trying cases involving quantitative data of various kinds
who do not know the difference between a bookkeeper, an accountant
and a statistician. Almost every day cases are tried in courts involving
controversies growing out of automobile accidents in which some
knowledge of the elementary laws of physics, such as the conservation
of momentum, would be of assistance, if not decisive, in determining
the plausibility of conflicting versions of the accident. In few of
these is such knowledge employed, presumably because its existence
and significance is unknown to both lawyers and judges.
The traditional hostility of the legal profession, including its
teachers, to a study of either the methods or subject matter of science
Mathematical Probabilities Misapplied to Circumstantial Evidence, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 745 (1966); State v. Sneed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2680 (N.M. S. Ct. May 31, 1966).
39. Address by Dr. Frank Stanton, President of the Columbia Broadcasting
System, to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, in Philadelphia, Pa.,
Oct. 5, 1966. Dr. Stanton points out that the major statistics are based upon subjective judgments "which would be thrown out of a court of law as evidence as
fast as they would out of a social scientist's laboratory." Clifton Daniel, an editor
of the New York Times, points out that of 11,724 felonies in New York City in
January 1965 only forty-one were mentioned in the press. Daniel, Fair Trial and
Freedom of the Press, Case and Comment, Sept.-Oct., 1966, pp. 3, 6. Robert C.
Notson, President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, says that it is
not true that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become
increasingly prevalent but that on the contrary American newspapers have been
increasingly circumspect in handling news of criminal matters. He states that
the reason the number of cases on this subject has increased is that the courts
have shown an increasing disposition to entertain appeals based on adverse publicity. Washington Star, June 12, 1966, §A, p. 12; Washington Post, June 12, 1966,
§A, p. 7.
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is too pervasive, persistent, and impractical to be explicable on either
historical or practical grounds. Rather it seems that lawyers view
science as a rival system which would displace the dialectic methods
of law with techniques alien to the law and uncongenial to lawyers.
Some of the more extravagant claims of a few social science advocates
have led lawyers to picture giant electronic computers as producing
automatic - and possibly even audible - answers to all legal questions, and to imagine electronic witness chairs that will determine
the credibility of witnesses. These would, in such view, reduce the
lawyers to nothing more than electricians' helpers, engaged in connecting up the legal research computer and the electronic witness
stand. But this fear itself is a fantasy which is born as much out of
ignorance of science as it is out of concern for the law and the legal
profession. No serious scientist would or could project such a future,
and even within the fields of pure science the empiric method has
produced no such result.
The fundamental point that lawyers, as well as scientists, must
understand is that both the dialectic method of law and the empiric
method of science are merely means of gathering and helping to
organize data, and that data may answer some simple specific questions but they do not provide answers to problems, particularly of
the kind with which law and government deal.
Lawyers generally are tired of having exhibited to them the wonders of modern scientific achievement in fields such as physical science
and medicine, with the implied suggestion (sometimes explicit) that
law could be as advanced if only it would adopt the same methods.
This is clearly not the case, and here the legal objection that legal
problems are frequently quite different from those of physics and
medicine is quite valid. The point that needs to be made, however, is
that the empiric and the dialectic methods are not rivals or alternatives but complementary methods adapted to different problems and
applicable in different situations.
The dialectic method of law is highly formalized in both procedure and substance. Despite the seeming simplicity of its two basic
principles, legal dialectic is today institutionalized in an elaborate set
of rules that has no counterpart in science. The dialectic method
of law is essentially clinical in the sense that it is best adapted to
investigation and determination of the "facts" 40 of individual cases,
and it is not well adapted to the investigation of mass or social problems. Legal procedures tend to stall or break down under the influx
of large numbers of cases (as in the recent flood of antitrust cases
40. As to meaning of "facts" in this context, see Loevinger, Facts, Evidence,
and Legal Proof, 9 W. REs. L. Rxv. 154 (1958), reprinted in LANDMARKS OF LAW
422 (Henson ed. 1960).
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in the electrical industry), and simply have no means of coping with
large populations or broad social investigations. Legal dialectic, for
all its formality and strict procedure, has only the most vague criteria
of inference or proof.4 1 The "presumptions" of law are essentially

rules dispensing with the need for evidence. The standards of inference are couched in such terms as "a preponderance of evidence" and
"beyond a reasonable doubt." There is no way of quantifying or
specifying these criteria and the law generally rejects any attempt
to do so. Thus the dialectic method of law stands as a formal, flexible, clinical approach to data gathering which is suitable to the
investigation of individual cases but not to group or mass phenomena.
The empiric method of science, in contrast, is informal in the
sense that it involves no specified procedures and has no rules respecting the kind of evidence that is acceptable or unacceptable.
Science is, however, rigorous in the sense that it has standards of
inference that are quantitative and specific and that have no counterpart in law. There are, for example, statistical measures of correlation that are regarded as criteria of significance in that correlations
of a given order will support an inference of a relationship whereas
correlations of a lower order do not justify any inference of a relationship. Furthermore, virtually all observations in science are reported with either an explicit or an implicit range of error or uncertainty. There are well-recognized conventions in science for specifying such uncertainty. While science does, on occasion, employ the
clinical method, it does not recognize clinical reports except insofar
as these are based upon some specified framework drawn from statistical, experimental or sampling data. In general, science is statistical,
and based upon measurements of central tendency and dispersion
among ranges of quantifiable observations. Such an approach is well
adapted to dealing with problems involving groups and masses, but
ill adapted to dealing with single or unique instances.
Thus the dialectic system of law and the empiric system of science are differing systems for securing data in differing circumstances,
each with its own appropriate function and proper field. Much of
41. The most ambitious attempt to formulate criteria of legal proof appears
to be WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937). With all due
respect to the substance of this work and the eminence of its author, it must be
observed that it consists more of a collection of then available data from various
fields of science that might be relevant to particular issues in litigation than of
any statement of general criteria or principles that might be of assistance in de-

termining issues of fact in legal controversies. The book plainly fails to achieve
its avowed aspiration to provide a "'novum organum' for the study of Judicial
Evidence." The failure of one so eminent, learned, and able in this field as
Wigmore to state them is persuasive that criteria or principles of judicial proof

are lacking.
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the difficulty in the relationship between law and science has arisen
from the failure of both lawyers and behavioral scientists to recognize
the limitations of their respective methods and the kinds of problems
to which they are appropriate.
Probably the main reason science has produced so little of significance in the field of law to date is that so far the effort has been
mainly to produce theories rather than data. Among those most
familiar with legal problems there has been very little understanding
of the need for data, the technique of gathering or mode of interpreting data in a scientific manner. Many seem to have labored
under the mistaken assumption that formulating a hypothesis in
scientific language was enough to make it scientific. It has been overlooked that the function of a hypothesis in science is to suggest an
area of observation and the means of testing for data, and that a
scientific hypothesis is merely a step in securing data which, in turn,
may lead to the formulation of theory. Unfortunately many who have
worked in the field of law are so accustomed to dealing in theory
that they elevate each hypothesis to a theory, omit the arduous task
of gathering corroborative data, and then regard each theory as an
established "fact." Thus many of the attempts to invoke science in
the field of law have been devoted to constructing large theories as
to the prediction of judicial decisions, particularly on collegiate
courts, 4 2 rather than to attempt to answer the more modest and
limited questions that science is presently able to handle competently.
Whether this misdirection of effort is due to the scientists or the
lawyers is not of much importance. It seems unlikely that science
will be invoked by lawyers to answer the myriad practical and signifi42. In the Harvard Law Review symposium on jurimetrics all six articles are
devoted to different approaches to the one broad problem of predicting or analyzing judicial decisions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1551 et seq. (1966). While the attraction of this topic for practicing lawyers is obvious, there are many other problems
in the field of law that are also important and probably more amenable to empiric
investigation. A number of them are suggested by the work of Professor Stuart S.
Nagel, one of the more imaginative research workers in this field. See Nagel, Law
and the Social Sciences: What Can Social Science Contribute?, 51 A.B.A.J. 356
(1965); Nagel 9, Gagliano, Attorney Characteristics and Courtroom Results, 44
NEB. L. REv. 599 (1965); Nagel, Simplified Bi-partisan Computer Redistricting,
17 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1965); Nagel & Curris, The Exercise of ProceduralDiscretion
by the Regulatory Agencies, 17 AD. L. BULL. 173 (1965); Nagel, Testing the Effects
of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 WIs. L. REv. 283; Nagel,
Testing Empirical Generalizations in Legal Research, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 365 (1963);
Nagel, Culture Patterns and Judicial Systems, 16 VAND. L. REv. 147 (1962). See

also

BERELSON & STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR: AN INVENTORY OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS

(1964); Stevens, A Metric for the Social Consensus, 151 SCmNCE 530 (1966). And
see authorities cited in notes 26, 28, 52, 35, 38 supra and authorities cited in
notes 43, 46, 50, 51, 52, 55, 57 infra.
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cant questions it is capable of investigating within the field of law
until there has been a much closer integration between legal and
scientific education, which means until lawyers and law professors
learn a good deal more about science.43 It seems clear that the need
in law today is not for more theories but for more data. What science
has to offer law in this generation, and probably in several succeeding
ones, is knowledge of how to gather, analyze and test data. The
theories will come - perhaps too soon, too fast and too profusely.
Most men much prefer the grand generalization and the stirring
4
conclusion to the limited observation and the partial correlation. 4
For the present and the foreseeable future science will serve law better
by encouraging a fact-skepticism than by promoting a theory4
dogmatism. 5

What then are the kinds of questions which can usefully be asked
by lawyers with a reasonable expectation that valid and reliable data
in response can be provided by the empiric methods of science?
Certainly no comprehensive or complete answer can be given at any
one time, for it is of the essence of the empiric method that questions
lead to data which lead to more questions that lead to more data,
and so on, in an infinite progression. However from a cursory survey
of the field a number of possibilities are apparent.
To begin with, the pioneering work of the Chicago jury project
should be the beginning, not the end, of a systematic attempt to
gather scientific evidence as to the behavior of juries.46

43. There seemed to be general agreement on this point at the Yale Jurimetrics Conference. See COMMUNICATIONS SCIENCES AND LAW: REFLECTIONS FROM
THE JURIMETRICS CONFERENCE (Allen 8& Caldwell eds. 1965), especially 191 et seq.

44. Long ago Maine observed that: "The inquiries of the jurist are in truth
prosecuted much as inquiry in physics and physiology was prosecuted before
observation had taken the place of assumption. Theories, plausible and comprehensive, but absolutely unverified, such as the Law of Nature or the Social
Compact, enjoy a universal preference over sober research into the primitive
history of society and law; and they obscure the truth not only by diverting
attention from the only quarter in which it can be found, but by that most real
and important influence which, when once entertained and believed in, they are
enabled to exercise on the later stages of jurisprudence." MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 3
(5th ed. 1873).
45. David Reisman observes that social science today operates within a range
the ends of which are "theory" and "data." He says that there are really extra-

ordinary difficulties in linking important social science generalizations to measureable data. Reisman, Some Observations on Social Science Research, in INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED AND OTHER ESSAYS

467 (1954).

46. See JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY (1962); KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966). See also report of the study at Washington University,
"Juries Can Follow Instructions, University Sociologist's Study Shows," Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1966, §A, p. 21.
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An obvious rich mine of data, that lies virtually untouched, is
the records of judgments in the hundreds of trial courts throughout
the country in various categories of cases. Any competent surgeon
is prepared to advise a patient of the general statistics as to success
in a given type of operation. Such statistics reflect only the experience of the general population and, as both surgeon and patient
recognize, do not necessarily indicate the prognosis for an individual.
The professional judgment of the surgeon is necessarily involved in
advising whether a given individual has an average, better than average, or worse than average chance of surviving an operation and enjoying a successful result. Strangely enough, there are no comparable
data available to lawyers. Individual experienced trial lawyers have
their own observations to report. But the kind of data that are
routinely gathered in other fields have, up to the present time, been
ignored in the law. An example of the potential significance of such
data, other than as a basis for estimating probabilities of success, is
suggested by a current case in which lawyers for Negro defendants
condemned to death in Georgia are contending that the Georgia
statute imposing capital punishment has been discriminatorily applied against Negroes. 47 A more general investigation of a similar
kind is a study by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
as to whether Negroes in the South are more likely than whites to be
executed for rape. 48 Without in any way imputing any discredit or
bias to either of these investigations, it is suggested that the necessity
for the making of investigations of this kind by individual litigants
or interested organizations stands as a discreditable reflection upon
the law and the legal profession. The statistics as to judgments in
various categories of both criminal and civil cases should be routinely
gathered and reported by disinterested agencies, and should be readily available to litigants or other interested parties without any
suspicion that the interest of the parties may have influenced the data.
Similarly, statistics as to criminal sentences imposed, sufficiently
detailed to permit the correlation of severity with both crimes and
criminals, should be routinely gathered and available, as well as
statistics showing the subsequent criminal or noncriminal records of
defendants who have been subject to such sentences. 9
47. Sims v. Georgia, 87 S. Ct. 639 (1967). As suggestive of scientific techniques
for dealing with analogous data and problems, see Finkelstein, The Application
of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. Rav.

338 (1966).
48. Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1966.
49. It has recently been reported that a special committee has been appointed
in Great Britain to study the use of computers to achieve more consistent sentences by the courts. It is proposed that sentences for all types of crimes based
on records for the last ten years of all magistrate's courts would be stored in a
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An ubiquitous problem which should be, but seldom is, studied
in law schools is that of the reliability of observation and recall by
witnesses. 50 A related problem, of equal importance, that receives even
less attention is as to the effect of cross-examination in eliciting reliable recall.51
The award of damages as compensation for various categories of
torts involves a host of specific quantifiable questions for investigation. There are questions as to whether damage awards are in fact
compensatory and adequate to restore injured parties to normalcy,
questions as to what effects actual and potential liability and liability
insurance have as deterrents to tortious conduct, and questions as to
the social cost of accidents, compensation, and the maintenance of
52
the system of determining and awarding compensation.
In the field of business regulation, we are operating on the basis
of hypothesis and assumption, rather than of data; and the whole
5
field of the actual effect of regulatory action remains to be explored. 3
Perhaps the largest, most important -and most fallow- field for
investigation in the area of law is that involving the meaning of
terms used. There is an ineluctable relationship between science and
semantics, and the first requirement of scientific procedure is a clear
54
specification in concrete or operational terms of the symbols used.
This has led, in turn, to a recognition of the influence of language
upon observations and ideas. 55 As a beginning, some effort should be
made to ascertain whether or not lawyers and judges have similar
or different ideas when they use such vague and abstract terms as
"justice," "obscenity," "reasonable," and "public interest." There
is reason to think that such terms do not have any commonly understood or agreed meaning, and merely mask disagreement and misuncentral computer and thus be available for retrieval and study. 3 World Peace
Through Law Center Bulletin, No. 4, April 1966. The lack of such data has
occasioned the criticism of criminal sentencing as a "guess in a vacuum." See
Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1966, §A, p. 16.
50.

LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT (1966); MUNSTERBERG, ON
STAND (1908); McGaugh, Time-Dependent Processes in Memory
Storage, 153 SCIENCE 1351 (1966). James Marshall, supra, suggests a number of
questions for future research in the field although without proposing any exMARSHALL,

THE WITNESS

perimental design.

Stern, The Psychology of Testimony, 34 J. oF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL
3 (1939).
52. Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus in the Automobile Injury
Impasse, 52 A.B.A.J. 533 (1966).
53. Loevinger, Competition and Regulation as Alternatives, 11 ANTITRUST BULL.
101 (1966).
51.

PSYCHOLOGY

54.

BRIDGMAN,

THE LOGIC OF MODERN PHYSICS

(1927).

55. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY (1956). See especially the essay
on Science and Linguistics at 207 in the M.I.T. paperback edition (1964).
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derstanding. A simple objective survey of such a commonly used
term as "public interest" indicates that it has no common core of
meaning which is capable of being made operational either as a
guide to public officials in making decisions or to scholars in investigating government actions.50 There are techniques which permit
experimental and quantitative investigation of such semantic ques-

tions.

57

One simple experimental design so readily suggests itself, it is
remarkable it has not yet been utilized. A statement of the major
facts involved in a series of either actual or hypothetical cases might
be validated by submission to an appropriate panel of judges and
lawyers to insure that issues involving questions of justice (or some
other specified concept) were involved. Such statements could then
be submitted to representative samples of judges, lawyers, members
of other professions, college graduates, and the general population
in various communities for judgment as to the results dictated by
their individual sense of justice. If the results from all groups were
sufficiently congruent, an inference might be drawn that it makes
some sense to talk about a "sense of justice" or of injustice, or whatever. However, if there are significant differences between or within
such groups as to the dictates of their "sense of justice," or their
understanding of the term being investigated, then it would seem
that we should stop using such verbalization as though it represented
an identifiable phenomenon, at least until we can discover or formulate some operational correlate.
Scientific work on any of these questions, or similar ones, will
not only produce data of value in law, but, perhaps of even more
importance, will help to educate lawyers in understanding the empiric method of science, and the concepts and thought habits to which
it has given rise. 58 A fallacy popular among lawyers is that you have
solved a problem when you have applied a label to it. Some understanding of quantification, continua and the statistical distribution of
variation will surely help to avoid the errors of categorical thinking
and labeling.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that many of the questions which
science is best equipped to investigate in the field of law are questions cencerning mass or group behavior, and lie in the field that
has traditionally been known as "public law," as contrasted with
private law. Conceivably our system of private law can struggle
56.

ScHuBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST

(1960).

57.

CREELMAN, THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF MEANING (1966); LAssWELL et al., LANGUAGE OF POLITICS (1949); OscooD, Suci & TANNENBAUM, THE
MEASUREMENT OF MEANING (1957).
58. Loevinger, Science and Legal Thinking, 25 FED. BAR J. 153 (1965).
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along for many years employing only the dialectic method and taking
little or no account of science and its data. However, we cannot
survive and prosper as a society without the study and cultivation
of public law. The decline of public law as a subject of study and
concern in our law schools, 59 may well be due to the fact that its
effective pursuit now requires knowledge and use of the empiric
method of science and that this is not yet either accepted or understood in American law schools.
On the other hand, as the empiric and dialectic are complementary methods, and as there is a growing need for the study and use
of science in law schools, so science is coming to the stage where it
confronts problems that cannot be met wholly by its own methods.
Despite the protestations of some scientists that science is inherently
ethical,60 science is now confronting problems which are not soluble
by any empiric data nor by any of the principles inherent in the
empiric method. Profound ethical issues have arisen as to the use
of experimental drugs and medical procedures on human beings. 61
Serious questions are involved as to the right of privacy or of personal
integrity and its invasion by testing and other methods of behavioral
research. 62 Problems of even more far-ranging significance are presented by prospective scientific activity in genetic experimentation
and control,63 in environmental modification and pollution, and in
59.
60.
61.

Schubert, The Future of Public Law, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 593 (1966).
Glass, The Ethical Basis of Science, 150 SCIENCE 1254 (1965).
Wolfensberger, Ethical Issues in Research with Human Subjects, 155
SCIENCE 47 (1967); Lear, Do We Need New Rules for Experiments on People?
Saturday Rev., Feb. 5, 1966, p. 61; Lear, Experiments on Humans -The Growing
Debate, Saturday Rev., July 2, 1966, p. 41. The issue of medical experimentation
on human patients has recently been publicly debated in the New York State
Legislature and the public press, with revelations that are at least surprising. See
New York Times, Jan. 11, 1967, p. 1 (Thaler Charges Abuse of Indigents in City
Hospitals); New York Times, Jan. 13, 1967, p. 1 ("Smear and Scare" Charged to
Thaler by City's Doctors); New York Times, Jan. 16, 1967, p. 1 (City Hospital
Chief Admits Unapproved Experiments); New York Times, Jan. 17, 1967, p. 20
(Test Drugs Used Without Consent); New York Times, Jan. 18, 1967, p. 43 (Liver
Tests Made Without Consent).
62. Privacy and Behavioral Research -Preliminary
Summary of the Report
of the Panel on Privacy and Behavioral Research, 155 SCIENCE 535 (1967); Psychological Experiments without Subjects' Consent, 152 SCIENCE 1455 (1966); Ruebhausen &cBrim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 1184 (1965);
Symposium, 20 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 857 (1965), a special symposium issue
devoted to articles on testing and public policy.
63. See, e.g., Dobzhansky, Changing Man, 155 SCIENCE 409 (1967); J. HUXLEY,
ESSAYS OF A HuMANIST (1964), reviewed by Mirsky in Scientific American, Oct.
1965, p. 135; letters from Huxley and Mirsky on this subject, Scientific American,
Jan. 1965, p. 6; further letters from scientists concerning the desirability of a
program for genetic improvement of the human race may be found in Scientific
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determining an appropriate relationship between science and politics,
especially with reference to an allocation of resources between basic
64
and applied research and between physical and social sciences.
It cannot be claimed that the dialectic method of law will provide scientists with any sure guide to a proper course in such problem
areas, any more than employment of the empiric method will provide
certain solutions to legal problems. 5 However, as the underlying
concepts of the empiric method are appropriate, and perhaps indispensable, to consideration of some of the problems confronting the
law, so concepts of the legal dialectic are equally applicable to such
ethical problems of science. The basic concepts of due process, of
fair hearing of divergent views of thoughtful consideration, of full
discussion between informed and competent advocates, and, above
all, the reference to a humane ethic are of far more relevance to these
problems of science than are the canons of experimental design, the
rules of statistics, or the laws of thermodynamics.6
Thus both lawyers and scientists must recognize that both the
dialectic and the empiric methods are now highly developed and
American, Jan. 1965, p. 8; "Controlled Biological Advances Pondered," Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1966, §A, p. 13.
64. Issues such as these are continually debated in articles and letters in
Science, and are increasingly gaining the attention of scientists and others concerned with such matters. For a casual sampling of such debate, see BARBER,
THE PoLrrics oF RsEARCH (1966), reviewed by Gilman in "Reaping the Whirlwind," Book Week, Aug. 7, 1966, p. 3; Mesthene, Can Only Scientists Make Government Science Policy?, 145 ScIENcE 237 (1964); Waterman, FederalSupport of Science,
153 SCIENCE 1359 (1966); Waterman, The Changing Environment of Science, 147
ScmcE 13 (1965); Social Sciences: Where Do They Fit in the Politics of Science?,
154 SCINCE 488 (1966); "A Social Science Foundation," Washington Post, Oct. 31,
1966, §A, p. 20.
65. Examples of other issues in science that are not amenable to empiric
investigation or determination involve geographic criteria for research grants, 154
SCIENCE 562 (1966); response to Russian political questionnaires, 154 SCIENCE 338;
treatment of laboratory animals and conditions of animal experimentation,
"Animal Cruelty" Defined, Science News, Apr. 16, 1966, p. 261; 154 SCIENCE 336
(1966). Also see, Reistrup, The Moral Sense of the Scientists, 155 SCIENCE 271
(1967).
66. An editorial in Science by Rene Dubos says: "The philosophical and
social uncertainties that are emerging from scientific progress must be emphasized
just as much as the prospects of technological breakthroughs. Science and the
technologies derived from it will increasingly create economic, educational, and
ethical problems for which our communities can make responsible choices only if
steps are taken to increase general scientific awareness. . . . For a balanced and
orderly development of knowledge, it is essential that the public be given the
opportunity to participate in the formulation of the overall strategy of scientific
research. . . . Science would certainly benefit from the kind of evaluation that
professional critics give to other human activities. . . . [P]ersons who work at
the interface of science and society have become essential because almost everything that happens in society is influenced by science." 154 ScIENCE 595 (1966).
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specialized, that they serve differing needs and perform complementary functions. They are no longer rivals, if indeed they ever were,
even though historically they developed concurrently out of common
origins and in response to a common aspiration for more rational
methods than the superstitions of primitive religion.
The contemporary need in law is for a much wider and deeper
understanding of the empiric method and its implications and applications. This means jurimetrics, not jurisprudence. This is not to
say that the ruminative method of jurisprudence does not have its
place. It does; but there is little danger that lawyers will neglect
to sit and ruminate. The obvious danger is that they will do little
else. What lawyers must learn is to employ the empiric method,
which in application to legal problems is jurimetrics, and to begin
the long, arduous and patient accumulation of data which has been
the basis for scientific achievement in all other fields. Adding a
"lawyer oriented" label to the ruminative rationalizations of jurisprudence is not going to do any more to make it productive than
any of the old labels such as "historical," "natural law," "analytical,"
"sociological," or "realistic." What contemporary law needs is not
merely new slogans or labels but new data and systematic means for
acquiring more empirical data. This requires not a "lawyer oriented
jurisprudence," but a socially oriented jurimetrics.
This is not to say that any amount of money or effort will provide data that will disclose easy solutions of social and legal problems.
Science neither promises nor provides instant salvation. It is unlikely
that it will even prove a very steady compass to point the direction
of salvation, if there is such a thing. However, the methods, concepts
and thought processes of science are not only useful but indispensable
to the lawyer in the modern world both because so much of the
world's work and the subject matter of law is dependent on and
infused with science that the lawyer cannot hope to deal with it
competently unless he has more understanding than he can get from
a hurried textbook scanning in work on a specific case, and also because many problems within the law itself are amenable only to
empiric investigation. Unfortunately the teaching and the practice
of law are still largely based upon an earlier period when statutes
were few and relatively simple statements of policy, and when practical law was made in court. As a result, we have separated the study
of lawmaking, which we call political science, from law interpreting
and applying, which we call the practice of law. This makes about
as much sense as separating the study of anatomy and physiology
from the practice of medicine. The difficulty with incorporating the
scientific study of law into law school curricula is that it offers most
to the branch of law called public law, or political science, and the
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profit and interest is in the branch called the practice of law. What
is most needed now is a refining of concepts and a reformation of law
teaching so that the dialecticians of law learn the fundamentals of
empiric methodology, the theoreticians learn something of practical
problems, and the practitioners learn not only the rules but the
animating theory of both the dialectic and the empiric disciplines.
The great hiatus in law today is of an institutional means of conducting empiric research and of collecting, reporting, and collating
the results for consideration by decision makers.
We cannot reasonably expect to achieve the Socratic vision of
governors who are philosophers, lawyers and scientists all at the same
time. But the profession of law and those it serves can hope and
demand that the law schools begin to study both of the great systems
of gathering data, the dialectic and the empiric, and bring both to
bear in seeking solutions of the proliferating and increasingly complex problems of government in a scientific age, and in training those
who will become our future governors.
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